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I. Introduction 
U.S. President Barack Obama just concluded his trip to Japan, China, 
Singapore, and South Korea. Among his four Asian stops, China could be 
considered the most crucial. Earlier, Obama and Chinese President Hu 
Jintao met in early April during the G-20 Summit in London, in late 
September in New York for UN meetings and in Pittsburg again for the 
G-20 Summit. However, this marked the U.S. president’s first time to 
stand on Chinese soil. Observing the Obama-Hu summit, the world has 
focused on the two countries’ positions on human rights, Tibet, the Dalai 
Lama, Taiwan, Reminbi exchange rates, the dollar’s status, bilateral trade 
disputes, and other major issues that the two countries remain wide apart 
on. Also of great concern are the other global and regional issues, such as 
anti-terrorism, nuclear threats and proliferation, the international financial 
crisis, climate change and global warming, Iran and North Korea, and 
issues for which “standing together is in mutual interests, and standing 
apart jeopardizes both sides.” However, Taipei’s major concern is the two 
countries’ attitude on the Taiwan issue, which can only be examined from 
the U.S.-China Joint Statement, issued on November 17 by the two 
leaders, and their joint press conference. The previous US-China joint 
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statement was signed 12 years ago, in October 1997, by then Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin and former U.S. President Bill Clinton during 
Jiang’s trip to the United States. 
 
II. U.S. and China’s Positions on the Taiwan Issue 
First, regarding the one China issue, in the Part II entitled “Building 
and Deepening Bilateral Strategic Trust” of the U.S.-China Joint 
Statement signed by the two leaders on November 17, the Chinese side 
emphasized that “The Taiwan issue concerns China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity;” and the U.S. side stated that it “follows its one-China 
policy and abides by the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués.” The 
wording “its one-China policy” means that Washington intends to follow 
its own, not China’s, one-China policy, with a clear note to distinguish 
itself from Beijing’s consistent rhetoric and a strong implication that 
Washington retains its own interpretation of its policy. Conversely, Hu 
told the joint press conference that “President Obama on various 
occasions has reiterated that the U.S. side adheres to the one-China policy, 
abides by the three Sino-U.S. Joint communiqués, and respects China’s 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity when it comes to the Taiwan 
question and other matters.” The only difference is that unlike Beijing’s 
traditional reference to the “one China principle,” Hu adapted to the 
American wording of a “one China policy” this time instead of the 
“one-China principle.” 
 
Second, the Taiwan media and the general public noted that in the 
town hall talk with Chinese students in Shanghai on November 16, 
Obama did not mention the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and nor did he 
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in the U.S.-China Joint Statement on the following day. On these two 
occasions, the U.S. president only mentioned the three U.S.-China Joint 
Communiqués. These two omissions triggered worries about a rollback in 
Washington-Taipei relations. However, from another perspective, the 
town hall talk was meant to be an unofficial occasion, therefore an 
inappropriate occasion to announce or reiterate the American policy 
baseline. Also, the 1997 U.S.-China Joint Statement did not mention the 
TRA either. Nevertheless, Obama selectively used the joint press 
conference, where Hu was present, to bring up the TRA. Obama said, 
“Our own policy, based on the three U.S.-China communiqués and the 
TRA, supports the further development of these ties – ties that are in the 
interest of both sides, as well as the broader region and the U.S.” Former 
AIT Chairman of the Board and Managing Director Richard Bush, in an 
interview with Taiwan’s Central News Agency, said that the United States 
never mentioned the TRA in previous joint statements. Bush believed that 
Obama mentioned the TRA in an appropriate manner and on an expected 
occasion; Bush was not surprised by this arrangement, adding that he 
believed there is no change in U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
 
Third, notably, Obama mentioned in the joint press conference that 
“the U.S. respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China,” 
which was also emphasized in the U.S.-China Joint Statement in the form 
of mutual consensus -- “The two countries reiterated that the fundamental 
principle of respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is 
at the core of the three US-China Joint communiqués, which guides the 
U.S.-China relations.” A number of observers considered this a rare 
practice in recent years, because a reference to the insistence on 
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“sovereignty and territorial integrity” has been Beijing’s traditional 
practice, and Washington has always hoped for not concurring. Despite 
this, a similar wording dates back to the 1982 U.S.-China August 17 
Communiqué -- “Respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs constitute 
the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations.” 
Technically speaking, Washington’s reference this time cannot be 
considered unprecedented. 
 
 Fourth, Washington traditionally said it is glad to see the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait engage in bilateral dialogue to reduce tensions, 
normally without specifying it to be cross-strait political dialogue. 
However, in the U.S.-China Joint Statement, the U.S. side clearly said, 
“The U.S. welcomes the peaceful development of relations across the 
Taiwan Strait and look forward to efforts by both sides to increase 
dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and 
develop more positive and stable cross-strait relations.” The wordings, 
though expressively mentioned cross-strait political dialogue, do not refer 
to any cross-strait agreements, such as a peace accord; the reference 
might include any general or comprehensive dialogue on various subjects 
that may contribute to stability in the Taiwan Strait. James Steinberg, U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State, mentioned in his speech, titled “The 
Administration’s Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship” delivered to the 
Center for A New American Security on September 24, for the first time a 
hope for Taipei to explore a confidence-building mechanism with Beijing 
in order to stabilize cross-strait relations. “Political dialogue” is an 
ambiguous term and particular sensitive, given Taiwan’s domestic politics 
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today. Taipei has mentioned more than once that it is not an opportune 
moment to kick off a cross-strait political dialogue. Therefore, against 
this background, Obama’s reference led to some worries that his 
administration has been leaning toward Beijing stand. 
 
III. Washington’s Arms Sale to Taiwan 
Undoubtedly, Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan have been a 
barometer of U.S.-Taiwan bilateral relations. Though never shy in trying 
to thwart and influencing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing has put 
further pressures on this issue on Washington at the current stage. For 
example, the Chinese Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, 
Xu Caihou, made it clear during a meeting in late October with U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates that Washington’s sale of either 
F-16CD or any other weapons will bring about a strong reaction from 
Beijing. Xu added that any improper handling of this issue by the Obama 
administration will severely jeopardize bilateral relations. Wang Yi, 
Chinese minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, noted 
during his June trip to the United States that while U.S.-China relations 
are improving drastically, Washington should stop arms sales to Taiwan. 
 
For Beijing, a successful thwart of Washington’s sales of F-16CDs to 
Taiwan would be a significant and surprising diplomatic victory. If it 
cannot thwart the sale, Beijing stills hopes to delay such a sale through its 
constant pressure on Washington. Another issue to watch is that at a time 
when cross-strait relations are warming up, Beijing will not only 
highlight the justification for no more U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, but also 
ask Taipei to stop buying U.S. arms through pushing cross-strait 
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confidence- and security-building measures. 
 
 In Washington, before the president’s Asian trip, American 
ranking officials on national security and foreign affairs disclosed 
important policy messages during events hosted by think tanks or during 
media interviews. In an event hosted by the Center for American Progress 
on November 8, while responding to questions, Steinberg reiterated that 
the Obama administration will abide by the TRA and provide adequate 
weapons in line with Taiwan’s defense needs. He said that despite likely 
unpleasant reactions from Beijing, Washington will still do so, which is 
not only obliged under the TRA, but also is a thing that should be done. 
However, Steinberg did not specifically address the arms sales of the 
F-16CDs to Taiwan. On the same day, Jeffrey Bader, the Senior Director 
for East Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, in an event hosted 
by the Brookings Institution, said that the Obama administration’s arms 
sales policy to Taiwan will remain consistent and unchanged from 
previous administrations. In Manila, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton on November 13 was asked by a reporter of the Voice of 
America whether Washington will gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. 
She said that Washington will inform Beijing that it will provide 
defensive weapons to Taiwan on an as-needed basis. Right after the 
Obama-Hu summit, Bader told the media that Obama mentioned clearly 
to Hu that Washington will remain unchanged in its arms sales policy to 
Taiwan and will “do whatever necessary in that respect.” 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In summary, before Obama’s Asian trip, many international media 
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and observers had predicted that Washington and Beijing would reiterate 
their respective positions, and that there would be no great surprises. 
Afterwards, Obama’s reiterated U.S. positions in the joint press 
conference, saying that the U.S. will abide by the three U.S.-China joint 
communiqués and the TRA -- an indication that Washington’s position on 
the Taiwan issue and relations with Taipei did not show any basic change. 
However, Taipei should pay attention to Washington’s hope for a 
cross-strait political dialogue, which might carry subtle implications. 
 
In fact, before Obama’s visit, Bader indicated in a Brookings 
Institution event that the three U.S.-China joint communiqués and the 
TRA have constituted a framework where the Taiwan status issue has 
been thoroughly addressed. Bader emphasized that Obama would not 
touch upon this area during the president’s China visits, that U.S. policies 
remain unchanged, and that Washington has no intention to break into 
this already tested domain. After Obama’s trip, moreover, AIT Chairman 
Raymond Burghardt visited Taiwan to reassure Taipei that the TRA 
remains the guiding document governing relations between the two 
countries and U.S. policy on Taiwan remained unchanged, including its 
position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and commitment to assist Taiwan to 
meet its defense need.       
 
From Taiwan’s perspective, actually, a three-win situation, where the 
triangle relations, namely the Washington-Beijing ties, cross-strait 
relations, and Washington-Taipei ties, remain stable and positive will best 
meet Taiwan’s strategic interests. Washington-Taipei relations have been 
the center of the gravity of Taiwan’s foreign relations, having a 
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high-degree of symbolic and substantive significance, both politically and 
in the sense of national security. Therefore, Taipei should pay extremely 
close attention to Washington’s Taiwan policy shift, if any, after the 
Obama-Hu summit with high vigilance and no negligence. This is 
particularly true at a time when Washington desperately needs Beijing’s 
cooperation today. Arms sale might be the most crucial and sensitive 
issue in the U.S-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship. Taiwan should try 
hard to avoid the sales of F-16CDs to be the new U.S. administration’s 
baseline. If, in the end, the U.S. side clearly informs Taiwan that it is 
impossible to offer to sell these fighter jets in the near future, this could 
set a precedent, which Beijing could use direct or indirect means to 
pinpoint a specific military item and influence Washington’s discretion in 
the sale of that particular item. If this unfortunate outcome comes to 
surface, this would mean an irrevocable damage to Washington-Taipei 
relations and Taiwan’s security. Politically, this means that these F-16CDs 
have been interpreted by Washington to be Beijing’s redlines, even 
though Beijing might not be so specific; and Washington is willing to 
accommodate Beijing’s concerns and delay the sale indefinitely. In the 
security sense, this means that Washington has demarked an invisible 
F-16CD grade threshold for its arms sales to Taiwan and future sales of 
any U.S. military equipment will fall below this invisible quality ceiling. 
Taipei should let Washington understand that a Taiwan with full 
self-defense capability will be free from backyard worries and become 
more confident in dealing and communicating with Mainland China to 
construct more stable cross-strait relations. 
